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BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 
Tht Bilti&n Qtidnancz VtpaKtmznt and Canada'* Canal*, 1S15-
1855. George Raudzens, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 1979. Pp. xi, 204. 
The British army's Ordnance Department was headed by a Master 
General and Board of Ordnance. The Master General commanded 
the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and Royal Sappers and 
Miners, held a seat in cabinet and, with the aid of the Board, 
was responsible for the manufacture, procurement and trans-
port of all war supplies for the army and navy, the topograph-
ical survey of the United Kingdom and the construction and 
maintenance of fortifications, storehouses and military build-
ings throughout the British Empire. 
In this book, George Raudzens seeks to enhance our understand-
ing of the British military's contribution 'to the shaping of 
Canada' by providing an administrative history of the Ordnance 
Department in the context of its particular contribution to 
Canadian development. The book focuses on the Ordnance's 
Canadian canal construction program because the canals, which 
were intended to provide a secure interior military transpor-
tation network, were the Ordnance's 'outstanding contribution' 
to the development of Canada. Other contributions of the 
Ordnance Department to Canadian development are merely touched 
on in passing. 
The opening chapters set forth the organization, duties and 
growing responsibilities of the Ordnance in the post-war of 
1812 period, and most importantly, the success of the Duke of 
Wellington, the Master General, in resisting efforts to bring 
the department under close parliamentary control. The de-
ficiencies in the existing system of Imperial administration 
and financial control are illustrated by what transpired on 
the Ottawa Canals project where work commenced in 1819, and 
the point made that when Lieut. Colonel John By of the Royal 
Engineers was appointed to superintend the Rideau Canal pro-
ject in March 1826, the system remained open to exploitation 
by a determined man seeking his own ends. Colonel By 's ac-
tivities are the main focus of the book through the launching, 
expansion and final completion of the Rideau Canal amidst con-
troversy over his expenditures. Succeeding chapters are de-
voted to the subsequent conflict concerning the Ordnance prop-
erties in the Canads, concluding with a general sketch of the 
Ordnance's impact on Canada prior to its demise in 1855. 
Raudzens, following J.S. Galbraith's thesis in 'The Turbulent 
Frontier as a Factor in British Expansion' [CompaA.atA.vo. 
Studle.6 In Society and Hiatotiy, 2, 1959-60, 150-68), sees 
Colonel By in the same mould as the so-called 'man-on-the-
spot' Imperial administrators. The proconsuls on the fringes 
of the British Empire who, through taking advantage of poor 
communications with London, acted on their own personal in-
clinations and views as to what local circumstances required. 
Men who, often in direct violation of their instructions from 
London, committed the British government to a policy of 
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aggrandizement through territorial expansion, at the cost of 
colonial wars and heavy expenditures, and/or, as Raudzens at-
tests in By1s case, committed the home government to massive 
expenditures in pursuit of personal ambitions. 
More specifically, it is argued that Colonel By, to satisfy 
his personal designs and grandiose plans, deliberately opposed 
the orders of his superiors and through guile, evasiveness and 
good luck, managed to commit the British government to con-
structing a canal much larger than the supreme military strate-
gist, the Duke of Wellington, wanted built. Thereafter, 
Colonel By through taking advantage of the loose system of 
Imperial financial administration, the imprecise nature of 
his instructions, and a series of either careless or delib-
erately-evasive estimates prepared by himself, managed to e-
vade the limits imposed on his annual expenditures and carried 
on so extravagantly on the Rideau that costs escalated five-
fold over the preliminary estimate of £169 ,000 formed by the 
Ordnance for the project. In all, £822,804 was spent on the 
Rideau project, by far the largest expenditure on any Imperial 
defence project throughout the course of the 19th century. 
In sum, Colonel By is depicted as one of the worst types of 
'man-on-the-spot1 who exploited his position so blatantly that 
he brought the wrath of the Treasury Board down on himself and 
the Ordnance with the result that the system of Imperial fi-
nancial control was tightened up and the Treasury Lords re-
fused to countenance any further large-scale expenditures on 
colonial defence projects. This was a minor disaster for the 
Ordnance as it meant that the Duke of Wellington's grand stra-
tegy for the defence of the Canadas could not be carried to 
completion, and with no monies forthcoming to finish enlarging 
the Ottawa Canals on the scale of By's large Rideau Canal 
steamboat lock, the monies expended on enlarging the Rideau 
Canal locks was supposedly largely wasted. The Rideau Canal 
as constructed by Colonel By, although admittedly an impres-
sive technical achievement, 'left the Ordnance with more 
canal problems than benefits.' These developments, it is con-
cluded, were a direct result of the inadequacies of the 
Imperial system of administration which prevented the London 
authorities from restraining Colonel By, their 'man-on-the-
spot, ' from embarking on the construction of a much larger 
canal than was necessary and spending unjustifiably excessive 
amounts of money. 
Unfortunately, where Colonel By's activities and expenditures 
are concerned, this book suffers from a narrowness of treat-
ment and an analysis pursued in a vacuum. The argument pre-
sented bears all the marks of an effort to support an a pK<lon.<l 
thesis by means of a selection of evidence, often taken out of 
context. Colonel By's escalating expenditures are duly noted, 
as well as the Ordnance's initial negative reaction to his 
proposal for enlarging the Rideau Canal locks; but subsequent 
developments in the technical arguments involved in that ini-
tial rejection are ignored, as well as critical developments 
within the Ordnance Department, in Colonel By's dealings with 
the Ordnance and between the Ordnance and the Treasury Board. 
These developments, if treated in the context of the 
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construction problems encountered on the Rideau Canal project, 
a comparative analysis of costs/cost overruns on other major 
19th-century construction projects, and the technical/strategic 
implications of a Rideau steamboat navigation, would have cast 
Colonel By1s expenditures and achievements in a far different 
light. The author's narrowness of treatment is responsible 
for a number of questionable assumptions and conclusions, as 
for example: 
1) That Colonel By tricked the Ordnance into author-
izing the large lock steamboat navigation. 
On the contrary, the Ordnance's decision to reject By1s pro-
posal was not absolute. The great military potential of a 
steamboat navigation was realized, but it was rejected on the 
grounds of its supposedly far greater cost and technical con-
siderations — that steamboats could not operate on canals as 
the wash from their paddles would destroy the banks. There-
after, Colonel By was able to refute these arguments. He 
pointed out that the so-called Rideau Canal was in reality a 
canalized river system where high floods scoured the river 
banks each spring, and that the several canal cuts were being 
carried for the most part through the rock of the Canadian 
Shield, hence immune to damage from steamboats. Also, on the 
Rideau, high dams were being erected to flood out the rapids, 
as opposed to the more conventional approach of excavating 
long canal cuts around the rapids. Hence, as long as the 
depth of the navigation remained the same, the enlargement of 
the locks to accommodate steamboats would add relatively little 
to the total cost of the project. After two committees of 
Royal Engineers — the Bryce Committee in London, and the 
Kempt Committee on the Rideau — examined By*s plans, they 
concurred in his arguments, and the larger scale of lock was 
authorized in June 1828. 
2) That the large lock decision was a victory over 
the Duke of Wellington, and that Colonel By was lucky 
Wellington had previously resigned as Master General 
of the Ordnance (p. 78). 
What this assumption ignores is that in January 1828 Wellington 
had assumed the position of Prime Minister and First Lord of 
the Treasury in his own government. Had he continued to op-
pose the larger lock, it would not have been approved. 
3) That Colonel By was slothful in producing his 
initial survey report (pp. 66, 68), and that it was 
carelessly produced, if not 'deliberately evasive' 
(p. 75). 
How does one reconcile this with the Bryce Committee's com-
mendation of By's survey report for the 'care and accuracy' 
displayed (p. 76), and the dispatch with which it was pro-
duced (p. 77). The author's comments betray a lack of under-
standing as to the difficulties and time-consuming labour in-
volved in preparing a plan of construction and detailed es-
timate for a major construction project on the scale of the 
Rideau Canal. 
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4) That Colonel By, owing to a defective system of 
financial control, was able to spend 'massive un-
authorized sums1 on the Rideau Canal, and that the 
Ordnance and Parliament had no power to restrain him 
(pp. 10, 80-81, and 93). 
Contrary to the author's assumption, Colonel By was as much 
sinned against as sinning. He was not the architect of his 
instructions. On the Rideau Canal project, the Ordnance, 
to speed construction, had adopted an open-ended contract 
system with the contractors being paid per unit of work com-
pleted and no limit on the amount to be paid out in any 
year. Previously on Ordnance construction projects, expen-
ditures were limited to the amount of the annual parliamen-
tary grant, with the project closing down on the grant being 
expended. However, Colonel By was instructed to ignore the 
annual parliamentary grant, and to pay the contractors out of 
the Military Chest to avoid any curtailment of construction 
should the annual grant be exceeded. This system, as the 
Ordnance realized from the beginning, deprived the superinten-
ding engineer of control over his expenditures, but it was 
assumed that the total expenditures would even out by the end 
of the project. Excesses in any of the early years of the 
project would be offset by underspending in the latter years 
of the project as it was wound down. However, when costs con-
tinued to soar beyond the annual grant over the last years of 
the project, the Ordnance shrank from the only course open — 
abrogation of the contracts — for fear of being sued by the 
contractors. Far from exploiting the system to his advantage, 
By was a victim of the open-ended contract system devised by 
the Ordnance. 
5) That Colonel By continually overspent his cost 
estimates (p. 80) and exceeded the original Rideau 
Canal estimate five-fold (p. 64). 
Such statements are gross distortions as they fail to take 
account of the fact that the preliminary estimate was not 
formed by Colonel By, and that the several early estimates 
were for a smaller scale of canal. By's estimate for the 
scale of canal actually constructed was B576,757, and when in 
1830 flood waters flowing over several of the newly-completed 
high dams threated to undermine them, the estimate had to be 
increased to £693,449 to cover the cost of constructing waste 
weirs to protect the dams. At that time, only h30,124 of the 
new supplementary estimate was to cover a projected cost over-
run on the estimate, and both the Ordnance and Parliament ac-
cepted the projected overrun as 'not unreasonable' given the 
large sums being spent in prosecuting works in a veritable 
wilderness. Thereafter costs soared, in the face of malaria 
and costly hard rock excavation work, to a final cost of 
£822,804. Although this sum included the cost of items not 
in the estimate, such as bridges and blockhouses, nonetheless 
taken as a bald figure By's total expenditure represents an 
increase of 42.6 percent on the estimate for the locks actually 
constructed, and only 18.6 percent on the supplementary es-
timate accepted by Parliament. By way of comparison, the 
Ordnance Ottawa Canals project had a cost overrun of 60 percent 
114 
on a supplementary estimate, and had been running 222 per-
cent above the original estimate. The contemporary Welland 
Canal project had a cost overrun of 55 percent, and the 
Caledonian Ship Canal constructed by Thomas Telford, one of 
the pre-eminent civil engineers of the age, had a cost over-
run of 87.6 percent. Such overruns were typical of major 
19th century construction projects, many of which proceeded 
under far less trying conditions than those on the Rideau. 
6) That Colonel By1s heavy expenditures on the 
Rideau project crippled Wellington's defence plan, 
thereby endangering Canada's military security 
(pp. 63, 94). 
This conclusion ignores the fact that Wellington's defence 
scheme was never a viable undertaking. From its inception 
in 1825, successive governments had refused to bring it be-
fore Parliament because of the heavy projected expenditures, 
and in 1828 when Wellington, as Prime Minister, insisted on 
the scheme being presented to Parliament, all of the pro-
jected works were rejected after an acrimonious debate. 
Thereafter, as a compromise, two new projects were author-
ized — the Halifax citadel, and new fortifications at 
Kingston — but on a reduced estimate. After the fall of 
Wellington's government in November 1830, the new Reform 
government curtailed the Kingston project, and refused to 
authorize any new colonial defence works. The escalating 
Rideau expenditures were no doubt a factor, but not the cri-
tical factor. 
7) That the original scale of canal would have suf-
ficed, and By's heavy expenditure in constructing 
the larger steamboat canal was 'a waste' (p. 94). 
This conclusion ignores the fact that the topography, mapped 
during the initial survey — the high rock cliffs, extensive 
swamps and large lakes — ruled out the construction of tow-
paths along the canal. This fact alone, as the Kempt Com-
mittee attested in June 1828, necessitated the employment of 
steam propulsion on the canal. Otherwise, in the absence of 
towpaths, vessels propelled by sail could be held up for days 
or even weeks on end awaiting a favourable wind where the 
narrow river made tacking impossible. Hence, the need for 
the larger locks capable of passing steamboats. 
The author also, though he comments on the commercial impact 
of the Rideau Canal, overlooks the military implications of 
the steamboat navigation. From its opening in May 1832, the 
Rideau Canal steamboat navigation was and remained a vital 
element in British military planning for the defence of the 
Canadas. Moreover, its importance actually increased with 
the defeat of Wellington's scheme to defend the Canadas with 
a lightly-garrisoned system of large permanent fortifica-
tions. Thereafter, the military planned to defend the 
Canads with a large, highly-mobile field army capable of re-
pulsing any American attack, and the speed, certainty and 
economy of transport provided by the Rideau Steamboat naviga-
tion was essential to the implementation of that plan. 
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Indeed, the Duke of Wellington in an 1841 reappraisal of the 
Canadian defence plan stated that: 
'However expensive the works upon the Rideau, no-
body now doubts the wisdom of the plan, its effi-
cacy, and above all, its economy.' 
In many ways, The Biltiàh Ordnance. Department and Canada'& 
CanalA is a very unsatisfactory book which, in focussing on 
Colonel By1s activities on the Rideau project, loses sight of 
its main aim: to elaborate on the British military's con-
tribution 'to the shaping of Canada.1 Nonetheless, the sub-
ject is one that merits further study, and it can only be 
hoped that this initial effort will encourage others to pro-
duce a fuller, more satisfactory treatment. 
Addendum: Lieut E.C. Frome's article is not the only con-
temporary technical treatment of the Rideau Canal project. 
Lieut W.T. Denison, who also worked on the Rideau project, 
published three contemporary articles in the Pape/L6 on 
Subjects Connected with the Vutle* o& the Royal Engineer. 
Two of these articles pertain directly to the canal struc-
tures: 'Rideau Dams,' vol. 2, 1838; and 'A Detailed Descrip-
tion of Some of the Works on the Rideau Canal, and of the 
Alterations and Improvements made therein since the Opening 
of the Navigation,' vol. 3, 1839. 
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